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Abstract 
Using the difference-in-differences estimator and data provided by the German Socio-
Economic Panel, this article explores migrants’ preferences for state-provided welfare. The 
study finds evidence that over time, the preferences of immigrants and natives become 
more similar. We interpret this finding as evidence that the culture of home countries does 
not have a time-invariant effect, and that immigrants’ welfare preferences are subject to a 
socializing effect of the host countries’ welfare regime. 
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Introduction 
The consequences of migration for public support of the welfare state are hotly debated. 
Building on US-American research about the influence of racial heterogeneity on the welfare 
preferences of white US-Americans (Alesina et al., 2001; Gilens, 1999), some scholars argue 
that migration could undermine natives’ support for welfare. Recently, increasing ethnic 
diversity of European countries has raised the question of whether European welfare states 
might be pushed towards lower, more US-American-like levels of welfare spending (Alesina 
and Glaeser, 2004: 175; Van Oorschot, 2006). The underlying assumption of these inquiries is 
that natives’ welfare preferences shape the future welfare state via the democratic process 
of representation. Several studies which focused on European countries have found that 
migration and attitudes towards migrants affect Europeans’ preferences for redistribution 
(for recent overviews see Brady and Finnigan, 2014; Schmidt and Spies, 2014; Schmidt-
Catran and Spies, forthcoming).  
Surprisingly, migrants' own welfare preferences are largely missing from this body of 
research, with few notable exceptions (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Reeskens and Van 
Oorschot 2015). However, migrants’ preferences are of vital importance for several reasons. 
Firstly and quite generally, migrants’ welfare preferences are of interest because as they 
gain the right to vote in their host countries, they also have the potential of directly shaping 
the future welfare states. Welfare regimes promote justice principles which are shared 
among the population (Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Clasen and Van Oorschot, 2002). Popular 
support for a welfare system depends on this consensus and is crucial for its persistence 
(Brooks and Manza, 2006). If welfare preferences from countries of origin are persistent—as 
argued by Luttmer and Singhal (2011), then the inflow of immigrants could undermine social 
consensus about the state’s role in welfare distribution. If immigrants adapt their 
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preferences to those in the host country, no radical change of this social consensus would 
occur. Our study provides evidence for this debate. Second, since previous research 
demonstrated that natives perceive immigrants as undeserving welfare abusers (Crepaz, 
2006; Van Oorschot, 2006), knowing whether immigrants themselves are actually more in 
favour of welfare redistribution than natives are, puts these perceptions into perspective. 
Third, exploring migrants’ welfare preferences also has consequences for the theoretical 
debate on the drivers of these preferences. On one hand, welfare regime theory assumes 
that welfare regimes reflect a dominant logic of solidarity (re-)produced by the institutional 
setting (Larsen, 2008; Mau, 2004). Thus, if migrants come in contact with the host country's 
welfare institutions , they will adopt that country’s preferences. On the other hand, migrants 
carry their home countries’ culture, including values which reflect individuals’ reliance on the 
state for welfare provision. To the extent that these cultural values are stable, migrants’ 
welfare preferences will be different from those of natives, and the differences will persist 
over time (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011). Researching migrants’ preferences with longitudinal 
data as we do in this paper enables a direct test of the implications of these theories. This 
article answers two interrelated questions. First, are there general differences between 
immigrants’ and natives’ welfare attitudes? Second, do the welfare attitudes of immigrants 
and natives converge over time? Our study finds clear evidence that over time, the 
preferences of immigrants and natives become more similar. We interpret this finding as 
indication that home countries’ culture does not have a time-invariant effect, and that 
immigrants’ welfare preferences are subject to the socializing effect of the host countries’ 
welfare regime.  
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In this article, we use panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(GSOEP) to compare the preferences of migrants from Turkey, Southern and Eastern Europe 
to those of native (West) Germans. The data allows us to contribute to the inchoate 
literature on migrants’ welfare preferences in two ways. First, while most of previous 
research has been purely cross-sectional (Dancygier and Saunders, 2006; Luttmer and 
Singhal, 2011; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2015) and therefore unable to directly address 
issues of change over time, we are able to give a methodologically sound answer to the 
question of whether immigrants’ and natives’ attitudes converge over time. Second, unlike 
previous studies, which use single items (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011) or simple mean-scores 
(Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2015) to measure welfare attitudes, we develop a 
measurement model of welfare attitudes that is tested for comparability between natives 
and migrants. That is, the measurement model is tested for measurement invariance across 
the groups under investigation and also across time to make sure that our comparisons are 
statistically valid. Although we analyze data from Germany only, we believe these insights 
are valuable for the more general debate, because Germany, like other western European 
countries, has long experience with a heterogeneous group of immigrants and because its 
conservative welfare system is typical for a larger group of European countries (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Arts and Gelissen, 2002). 
After a brief introduction on immigration and welfare system in Germany, we review 
the literature on welfare attitudes. Building on two theoretical explanations for migrants’ 
welfare preferences, the cultural and institutional approaches, we propose two hypotheses. 
We then present the data and methods, and the results of our analysis. We conclude with 
reflections on the future of the welfare state. 
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Immigration and welfare distribution in Germany 
After the Second World War, Germany has faced a permanent immigration flow of guest 
workers, family members of residents or asylum seekers and refugees. The proportion of 
foreign nationals rose from 1% in 1951 to 8.9% in 2002 (Riphahn, 2004) and to ca. 10.11% in 
2014 (DeStatis, 2014).  
At the beginning of 2000s minimum income support in Germany has been reformed. 
Before the reform, the main pillars of this systems were "unemployment benefit", 
"unemployment assistance" and "social assistance". Unemployment benefit was an 
insurance-based benefit, whose amount depended on duration and amount of payments. It 
was paid in full (60 to 67% of the previous net salary) for a period between 12 and 36 
months (depending upon the claimant's age and work history). In case of continued 
unemployment, a person would receive unemployment assistance, amounting to 53 to 57% 
of the last net salary. Social assistance was divided into general income support and support 
for special circumstances, and eligibility was independent of nationality and based only on 
residence and work history. However, in case of immigrants, different regulations applied. 
For example, ethnic German returning to Germany received full benefits, on equal basis to 
the natives, while immigrants on temporary residence permits were at risk of losing them in 
case of reliance on welfare benefits (Riphahn, 2004, Castronova et al., 2001). At the 
beginning of 2000 a set of reforms has changed the structure of minimum income support in 
Germany. The final step of these reforms known as Hartz IV combined unemployment 
assistance and social assistance in the "unemployment benefit II". This benefit is a flat-rate 
benefit independent of prior earnings, which can be claimed by individuals who exhaust 
their unemployment benefit I entitlements. Persons in need can also claim it regardless of 
previous insurance contributions or unemployment benefit I receipt. Benefits are paid to 
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those able to work at least 15 hours per week. Those not able to work, e.g. due to sickness, 
disability, or care responsibilities, are entitled to social assistance instead, whose eligibility 
conditions remained the same to the ones before the reform. As in the period pre-reform, 
immigrants have access to these benefits if they fulfill the eligibility conditions.   
Although immigrants are a relatively small fraction of the population of Germany, 
they account for a much larger proportion among welfare recipients. For example, in 2002, 
they accounted for 22.3% of welfare recipients, and 23.30 in 2014. Figures OA1 and OA2 
show that this is true for most of the postwar period. Given these numbers, the question of 
explaining the differences between immigrants' and natives' takeup of welfare benefits 
naturally emerged. Research has found that given eligibility, immigrants are not more likely 
to take up benefits than natives (Castronova et al., 2001), but immigrants are more likely 
than natives to find themselves in need. For example, in Germany 23.6% of migrant 
household are below poverty line, compared to only 6.3% of native households (Morissens 
and Sainsbury, 2005). Other studies showed that immigrants' higher welfare dependency 
rates (Boeri et al., 2002; Muenz and Fassmann, 2004) are linked to their socio-economically 
vulnerable position, characterized by lower education and income, and higher 
unemployment (Heath et al., 2008). Several studies have found that the use of welfare 
benefits differs across immigrant groups. For example, majority of recent intra-EU 
immigrants are more likely to find and take up employment, contribute with about 3% of 
total government revenue, and consume about 2.2% of total benefits distributed in Germany 
(see Tables OA1 and OA2 in the online appendix)1 (ECAS 2014). Riphahn et al. (2013) argue 
                                                            
1 In this version of the manuscript the online appendix is included at the end of the Tables and Figures Section. 
The final published paper will have an online appendix. 
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that although welfare users’ numbers are overall higher among Turks compared to natives, 
the difference between first-generation Turks and natives disappears after controlling for 
relevant socio-economic variables. The authors concluded that immigrants in Turkey are 
more likely to rely on welfare not because they are immigrants but because of their – on-
average – lower socio-economic position (also see Barrett and McCarthy, 2008). If 
immigrants' reliance on welfare is well-documented, it is less known what drives their 
preferences for welfare distribution. To this issue we turn now. 
 
Immigrants’ welfare preferences—theory and hypotheses 
This article, while recognizing that preferences for welfare distribution are influenced by 
personal economic situation (poverty, large number of dependents, difficult (re)insertion on 
the labour market), explores another set of determinants of welfare preferences, namely 
values and norms. On the one hand, individual values and norms are developed through 
family socialization and other formative experiences at the individual level, and their impact 
on individuals policy and political preferences are well researched (for preferences for 
redistribution, see Neundorf and Soroka unpublished manuscript, for effects on general 
economic preferences see also Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2009, Malmendier and Nagel 2011, 
Ehrmann and Tzamourani 2012). On the other hand, there are societal values and norms, 
whose impact remains hotly debated. The welfare state literature largely agrees that welfare 
regimes promote a dominant logic of solidarity (Andreß and Heien, 2001; Clasen and Van 
Oorschot, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Larsen, 2006, 2008; Mau, 2004). However, what lies 
behind this logic of solidarity is less clear. In our reading, the existing literature identifies two 
possible channels through which the logic of solidarity is transmitted: culture and 
institutions. These two channels are often not clearly separated, primarily because they are 
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empirically hard to disentangle (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011: 157). 
This is because, as the normative institutionalism posits (Larsen, 2006: 4-5), a welfare state’s 
“institutional logic” reflects the cultural background of a society. However, studying 
immigrants opens an insight into the effects of culture and institutions because, as they 
move between cultural and institutional contexts, they provide the researcher with a setting 
similar to a natural experiment (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013: 15-16; Dinesen, 2013).  
 
Culture and welfare preferences 
Culture can be defined as “customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social 
groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation” (Guiso et al., 2006: 23). It 
has been argued that cross-country differences in beliefs about self-determination, and 
therefore perceived causes of poverty, wealth and social mobility, are deeply rooted cultural 
traits. This in turn explains why public support for welfare is higher in some countries than in 
others (Alesina et al., 2001; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). At societal level, these cultural 
beliefs are covered by the concepts of individualism and its opposite, collectivism, which 
encompass sets of interconnected ideas about the individuals-society-state nexus. More 
precisely, from the individualist perspective, individuals are responsible for their own 
welfare (Barry, 1999; Pinch, 1997), success and failure in life are attributed to individual 
factors (Kluegel and Smith, 1986), and the “State delivery of welfare is seen as creating a 
culture of dependency […] and it should be limited to minimum levels” (Sabbagh and 
Vanhuysse, 2006: 613). Using Hofstede’s individualism measure (Hofstede 2001), Berigan 
and Irwin (2011) demonstrate that it is negatively related to public support for income 
redistribution. Following the same logic, this result can be extrapolated to other welfare-
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related dimensions. We therefore infer that support for state-distributed welfare services is 
likely to be lower in more individualistic countries (also compare Breznau, 2013). 
 
Institutions and welfare preferences 
As noted above, institutions reflect cultural backgrounds. However, Larsen (2006: 18, 45; 
2008) argues that welfare institutions themselves shape the perception of poverty and 
deservingness and consequently welfare attitudes. The implication is that individuals’ view 
of the world is not directly influenced by culture but rather through transmission via 
institutions. This interpretation conforms to Homans’ argument that “the rule of distributive 
justice is a statement of what ought to be, and what people say ought to be is determined, in 
the long run, and with some lag, by what they find in fact to be the case” (1974: 249-250).  
These institutional arguments suggest that selective welfare policies create a division 
between payers and receivers. This division not only lowers the perceived reciprocity of the 
system, but provides ground for discussion of whether receivers are actually needy, 
deserving and sufficiently grateful (Rothstein, 1998: 159). This stigmatization of the needy in 
selective welfare systems generates vicious circles because welfare receivers react 
negatively to their stigmatization, fostering the negative image that net-contributors have of 
them. On the contrary, universal welfare systems “instead of defining a line between ‘them’ 
and ‘us’, […] actually help define everybody within the nation-state as belonging to one 
group. The vicious cycle of selective welfare policy is replaced by a positive circle” (Larsen, 
2008: 153). For the purpose of our argument, from the institutional approach we derive the 
implication that preferences for state-provided welfare are likely to be positively related to 
the degree of universalism of a welfare regime.  
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Hypotheses 
Based on the two inferences following from the cultural and the institutional approaches, we 
can now formulate our expectations. But before, a clarification is needed: This analysis relies 
on a comparison between immigrants and West Germans . We use West Germans as the 
main comparison group of our analysis for two reasons: first, because before 1989, Western 
Germany was the main target of immigration; and second, because the conservative welfare 
system of West Germany was extended to include the new Länder after reunification. 
However, we also include the East German group in the analysis, because the East-West 
German comparison—given that East Germans experience a change from universalistic to 
conservative welfare system—provides supplementary evidence for the theoretical debate 
this paper addresses.  
We start with the cultural perspective. Hofstede’s individualism measure shows 
remarkable differences between Germany and the immigrants’ countries of origin which are 
part of our sample. According to this measure, Germany is a rather individualistic country 
with a score of 67 out of 100.2 The average score of all post-socialist countries, from which 
we observe immigrants and for which data is provided3, equals 47. The average score of the 
Southern European countries from which we observe immigrants in our sample4 is 47.25, 
and the score of Turkey is 37. Following the rationale of the first inference, we expect that 
immigrants have stronger preferences for state-provided welfare than (West) Germans as 
they originate from less individualistic cultures. 
                                                            
2 All reported measures from http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html (accessed at 12/19/2013).  
3 Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Russia, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania, 
Serbia. 
4 Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece. 
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To back up this intuition, Figure 1 shows a measure of support for state-provided 
welfare which we derived from the European Social Survey 2008 (ESS, Round 4).5 The figure 
includes all countries that are represented in the ESS and as countries of origin in our 
immigrant sample from the GSOEP. Unfortunately, the ESS does not include all countries of 
origin that we observe in the GSOEP. Nevertheless, Figure 1 provides support for the culture-
hypothesis formulated above: Migrants from post-socialist and Mediterranean countries 
(including Turkey) should show stronger support for state-provided welfare than native West 
Germans.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
As we have discussed above, these cultural difference overlap with the welfare 
regime types. On the one hand, socialist countries have had universal welfare states, with 
the state providing a wide range of benefits to everyone regardless of their contributions, a 
visible difference from the conservative regime of Germany, where benefits are strongly 
bound to individual contributions. Empirical analyses found that individuals living in these 
types of welfare states are more in favour of state-provided welfare than people from 
conservative welfare states (Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Roosma et al., 2013). On the other 
hand, the current consensus is that Mediterranean countries form a distinct welfare regime 
type (see Arts and Gelissen, 2002, for an overview of the debate), as “Their social security 
systems are immature because, on the one hand, there is no articulated net of minimum 
                                                            
5 The measure shown in Figure 1 and 2 has been derived by an exploratory factor analysis of six items on 
governments’ responsibility to provide “jobs”, “health care”, “standard of living for the old”, “standard of living 
for unemployed”, “child care services” and “paid leave from work”. Each item was measured on an 11-point 
scale ranging from “not government’s responsibility at all” [0] to “entirely government’s responsibility” [10]. 
The (maximum likelihood) factor analysis gave two factors with the first factor having an Eigenvalue of 3.16 
(second factor = 0.43, unrotated solution). The measure shown in Figure 1 and 2 is the factor score of the first 
factor.  
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social protection but, on the other, some benefits are very generous and some provisions 
are universal.” (Arts and Gelissen, 2001: 286). The Mediterranean cluster includes Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and Greece. To this cluster, Turkey has recently been added (Gal, 2010; 
Grütjen, 2008). After the Second World War, The Turkish welfare state has started to 
develop along the lines of a Bismarckian model (Şahin, 2008), and successive changes and 
recent reforms have brought it closer to the Mediterranean model (Grütjen, 2008; for a 
comparison, see Table OA3 in the online appendix).  
Following the rationale of our second inference, that the institutional setting of 
country of origin matters, we expect that immigrants from these areas are more in favour of 
state-provided welfare than West German natives. This expectation is based on the 
following rationale: Migrants originating in the former socialist countries were socialized in a 
strongly universal welfare state where the state was the main provider - and consequently 
continued to express preference for state-provision of welfare benefits after migration. 
Migrants originating in Southern Europe and Turkey were socialized in a welfare system 
which combined state provision for certain groups and some universal benefit categories 
with strong family provision. As migration disrupts the reliance on families, as family 
networks are being torn apart, these migrants are also expected to turn to the state for 
support. Figure 2 shows general support for state-provided welfare, the same factor score as 
in Figure 1, by welfare regimes. As expected, average support for state-provided welfare is 
much lower in West Germany, the prototype of a conservative regime, than in all other 
regimes types.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
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To summarize, the cultural and the institutional approach suggest that immigrants 
from former socialist and Mediterranean welfare regimes are more in favour of state-
provided welfare than persons socialised in conservative welfare systems. Among migrants, 
the former should have the strongest preference for state-provided welfare, because in the 
socialist regimes the state provided universal support, unlike Mediterranean regimes, where 
state support is directed to certain categories only. We expect to observe larger differences 
between West German natives and immigrants from countries with most different welfare 
system, namely post communist countries.6 Moreover, given that East Germans have 
experienced a change of welfare system similar to immigrants from Eastern Europe (from 
universal to conservative), we expect them to display a similar pattern of welfare 
preferences. 
However, although the institutional and the cultural approaches produce similar 
predictions with regard to initial differences between migrants and natives, they differ in 
their predictions as to the trend of these differences over time. Our specific hypotheses 
regard this trend. Hypothesis 1: If the culture approach is correct and the values are 
transmitted “fairly unchanged from generation to generation” (Guiso et al., 2006: 23), the 
above-mentioned differences remain stable over time. Hypothesis 2: If the institutional 
approach is correct, and the institutions shape preferences, then immigrants’ opinions about 
state’s responsibility for welfare distribution converge over time with those of natives. 
 
                                                            
6 Note that Figure 2 does not support the hypothesis that support is highest in post-socialist countries. In 
contrast, the figure seems to indicate that support is highest in Mediterranean countries. However, statistically 
there is no significant difference between the three groups “Mediterranean”, “East Germany” and “Post-
socialist”. All of these groups, however, show significantly more support for state-provided welfare than West 
Germans.  
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Alternative explanations: Selection effects 
If immigrants were a selected group with regard to their welfare preferences (this is, not 
representative for their origin countries), our expectation about the direction of the initial 
differences between immigrants and natives would be at stake. The hypotheses, however, 
remain valid as they relate only to convergence over time. Nevertheless, we will briefly 
discuss possible selection effects. The welfare magnet hypothesis (Borjas, 1999), argues 
immigrants with strong welfare preferences are attracted by countries with generous 
welfare states. There is some evidence that immigrants are attracted by more generous 
benefits (Heitmuller, 2005, Karidis and Quinn, 2006). But these studies do not factor in the 
fact that host countries, although they often provide more generous benefits in terms of 
amount compared to sending countries, also implement measures which restrict 
immigrants' access to these benefits (see for example Emmenegger and Careja, 2012, 
Kurekova, 2013, Careja, Emmenegger and Kvist, 2015).  
In contrast to the welfare magnet hypothesis, the self-selection hypothesis (Chiswick, 1999), 
presents immigrants as a self-selected group, characterized by self-confidence and risk 
acceptance. Since risk aversion is related to demand for welfare provision (Alesina and 
Ferrara, 2005), the self-selection hypothesis suggests that immigrants are less likely to 
demand state-provided welfare. Empirical evidence is ambiguous, with supporting (Borjas, 
1999; Brueckner, 2000: 514, 523) and disproving (Bonin et al., 2009; Brueckner, 2000: 523) 
findings. Therefore, while acknowledging possible selection effects, we maintain that, even if 
immigrants are a selected group, the question at the centre of this study, whether this 
group’s welfare attitudes are different from those of German natives and whether these 
differences decline over time, remains valid.   
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Data and methods 
Data 
We use data from two waves (1997 and 2002) of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP, 2011), which contain questions asking respondents’ opinions on state responsibility 
for distributing welfare benefits. The GSOEP samples all private households in Germany and 
oversamples immigrants’ households, therefore providing a unique opportunity to research 
immigrants’ attitudes. Our analysis is restricted to immigrants who permanently live in 
Germany but were born in another country.  
We distinguish immigrant groups based on the welfare regime in their home 
countries. The sample does not include enough immigrants from social-democratic or liberal 
welfare regimes but allows us to analyze immigrants from post-socialist and Mediterranean 
regimes. Table A1 in the appendix lists all origin countries, regime types to which they are 
assigned, and the number of respondents from each origin country. The Turks are the largest 
group of immigrants in Germany. The sample of Turkish immigrants is large enough to allow 
a separate analysis. Within each group, we additionally differentiate between migrants who 
had lived in Germany for up to ten years and migrants who had lived in Germany for more 
than ten years (as of 1997). If the hypothesis of converging welfare attitudes is true, we can 
expect that migrants who had lived longer in Germany are (already) more similar to 
Germans than those who have recently arrived.7  
Attitudes towards the government’s responsibility for welfare have been surveyed in 
1997 and 2002 with a battery of 11 items: 
                                                            
7 However, differences between these two groups could also be due to cohort differences. Therefore, the 
effect of the time of residence should be much more reliable if it is based on the observation of change over 
time within these groups as compared to an estimate that is based on a comparison between groups. 
16 
 
“At present a multitude of social services are provided not only by the state but also 
by private free-market enterprises, organizations, associations, or private citizens. 
What is your opinion on this? Who should be responsible for the following areas”?  
All items could be answered on a five-point scale ranging from [1] “only the state” to 
[5] “only private forces”. We reversed all scales to measure a positive attitude towards state 
responsibility. The single items cover five different areas of welfare: 
 Family and children: “financial security of families”, “caring for preschoolers”, “caring 
for school children”  
 Unemployment/provision of jobs: “financial security in case of unemployment”, “job 
creation measures”  
 Health care: “financial security in case of illness”, “care and help for the sick” 
 Old-age: “financial security for old-age”, “care and help for the aged”  
 General care: “financial security for persons needing care”, “care and help for 
persons needing care”  
We performed confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to summarize the 11 items into factor 
scores. Our analysis revealed three factors that underlie the 11 items: (un-)employment, old-
age/care/sickness, and family and children. The three factors are first-order factors that 
underlie a second-order factor which we termed general welfare. Figure 3 shows the 
structure of our final measurement model (Table A2 in the appendix presents the 
parameters). To derive a well fitting model, it was necessary to include error correlations 
between all items that ask for “financial security” and two additional error correlations 
between care-related and sickness-related items (see Figure 3).  
[Figure 3 about here] 
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We performed a variety of invariance tests to make sure that the latent factors can be 
compared across groups and years. Firstly, we fitted the model on the data from 1997 and 
tested for full scalar measurement invariance across the three groups West Germans, East 
Germans and migrants (CFI=.95, TLI=.95, RMSEA=.06, SRMR=.09). Secondly, we tested the 
model for full scalar measurement invariance between the three groups on the data from 
2002 (CFI=.94, TLI=.94, RMSEA=.06, SRMR=.11). Although the model fit of these two multi-
group CFAs is not perfect it can be considered a fairly good fit (Hu and Bentler, 1998: 449) 
and therefore suggests that we can compare levels of the latent variables between groups. 
Finally, we tested for measurement invariance across the two waves. Full scalar invariance 
did not hold and we therefore specified a model which allowed one item intercept to differ 
across years (care for school children). The intercept allowed to vary was chosen based on 
modification indices. This partial scalar invariance model has a reasonable fit (CFI=.98, 
TLI=.97, RMSEA=.05, SRMR=.04) and should still allow to compare the levels of the latent 
variable across time (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998: 82). From this measurement 
model, we predicted the three first-order factors and the higher-order factor for use as the 
dependent variables in the following analyses. Table 1 shows the correlations between the 
higher-order factor general welfare and its three sub-dimensions (Table OA4 in the online 
appendix reports the correlations of the four factor scores and all 11 observed items on 
which the measurement model is based). 
[Table 1 about here] 
To get estimates of the native-migrant-differential net of any self-interested related effects, 
all self-interest-related variables associated with migrant status and welfare attitudes have 
to be controlled for. We control for the respondents’ age class (<25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-
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65, 66-75, >75), gender, income (equivalized disposable household income; square root 
scale), education (ISCED categories 1-6 and a dummy for “still in education”), labour force 
status (employed, unemployed, retired, non-working), household type (one-person, couple 
without children, single parents, couple with children under 16, couple with children older 
than 16, couple with children younger and older than 16, multiple-generation household, 
other household type), satisfaction with health, self-assessed language proficiency8 and the 
cumulated experience of unemployment. The final data set has been obtained by listwise 
deletion. Tables OA5 and OA6 (online appendix) report correlations and summary statistics 
of all variables involved in the regression analyses.  
 
Method 
Our analysis has the purpose of estimating how differences between migrants and natives 
develop over time. To this end, we estimate the difference-in-differences (DID) (Wooldridge, 
2002: 130) based on data from 1997 and 2002. The DID estimator is usually applied to cross-
sectional data, where the estimates are often disturbed by sampling errors. In our analysis, 
we can be certain that the differences observed in 1997 can be compared with the 
differences observed in 2002 because at both points our sample consists of the same 
                                                            
8 Only migrants who have arrived after 1983 have been asked questions about their language proficiency. All 
native Germans and migrants that arrived before 1984 have been assigned to the category “very good”. We 
build an index from two items: spoken language proficiency and written language proficiency (Cronbach’s alpha 
= 0.93 [1997] and 0.93 [2001]). Questions about language proficiency were not asked in 2002 but in 2001. We 
substituted the values for 2002 from the 2001 data. For those migrants that have participated in 2002 but not 
in 2001, we imputed the values for language proficiency using an estimated language-learning function (37 
cases). We regressed migrants’ language proficiency in 2002 on their proficiency in 1997 and used this estimate 
combined with the individual values of 1997 to impute language proficiency values for missing cases in 2002. 
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respondents.9 Since the DID estimator applied here is a cross-sectional model, we use 
cluster-adjusted standard errors to estimate valid test statistics. 
The model has the following form: 
Xddy migranttmigrantt    200211200200ˆ  
where 2002td  is a dummy variable indicating the second measurement (2002=1, 1997=0) and 
migrant  is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a migrant (migrant=1, 
native=0). The vector  includes all control variables. The coefficient 1  gives the difference 
between migrants and natives in the first period (1997) and the coefficient 1  gives the 
difference-in-differences; i.e., the change in the differences between migrants and natives 
from 1997 to 2002. In practice, we do not have a dichotomous dummy variable ( migrant ) but 
a group of dummy variables because we compare four groups: West German natives; East 
German natives; migrants with up to ten years of residence; and migrants with more than 
ten years of residence. 
 
Results 
Derived from a full regression model of the general welfare factor, Table 2 presents 
predictive margins for each survey-year and all groups under investigation (see Table A3 in 
the appendix for the full regression model). Predictive margins are more intuitive compared 
to the standard regression tables because our model includes a variety of interaction terms 
which complicate the interpretation. The margins are predicted with all covariates at their 
mean and their differences can therefore be understood as the native-migrant-differentials 
                                                            
9 By applying the model to panel data and restricting our sample to those respondents observed in both years, 
the cross-sectional DID estimator is conceptually identical to the panel DID estimator (Wooldridge , 2002: 284).  
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net of any differences in socio-economic characteristics. The columns “Difference Natives 
West” provide the difference between the respective group and the reference group of 
West German natives. The columns “DID” provide the differences-in-differences estimators.  
[Table 2 about here] 
We have estimated one model in which we compare West Germans to all migrants and 
three additional models in which we compare West Germans to the three specific immigrant 
groups (Turks, immigrants from Mediterranean countries and immigrants from post-socialist 
countries). Thus, the models “Turks”, “Mediterranean” and “Post-socialist” are each based 
on a subsample of the full sample used in the model “All Migrants”. We expected that the 
results for the entire group of immigrants show higher demand for state-provided welfare 
compared to West German natives. Table 2 shows that the difference between West 
Germans and all recent immigrants—that is, immigrants who live in Germany for a maximum 
of 10 year—is .0458 in 1997 and .0370 in 2002. These differences are significant in both 
years. The differences in the differences (DID) is calculated as the difference between the 
values in 2002 and 1997 (.0370-.0458=-.00087). The DID is negative, which supports our 
general expectation of a convergence between natives and immigrants, but, in this case, it is 
not significant. For immigrants who live in Germany for more than 10 years, the difference 
to West German natives is .0373 in 1997 and .0097 in 2002. The DID (-.0276) is significant at 
the 1%-level, indicating a significant convergence between West German natives and these 
immigrants. The remaining difference in 2002 (.0097) is no longer significant. For East 
Germans we observe a similar pattern: A significant convergence with West German natives 
(-.0248***), although the remaining difference in 2002 is still significant in this case 
(.0616***).   
21 
 
 For recent Turkish immigrants we observe a significant difference to West German 
natives in 1997 (.0687*) that turns into a non-significant difference in 2002 (.0237); 
however, the DID estimator (-.0450) is not significant in this case. For Turkish immigrants 
who reside in Germany for more than 10 years we find a significant difference in 1997 
(.0523**) which turns into a non-significant difference in 2002. The convergence of attitudes 
towards state-provided welfare between these immigrants and West German natives is 
significant (-.0331*). The immigrants from the other Mediterranean countries show no 
significant difference to West German natives already in 1997. We cannot tell whether there 
have been initial differences which vanished before we observed these immigrants or 
whether there have not been any differences from the beginning; but we can state that 
these findings  are not contradicting our hypothesis of a convergence in attitudes.  
 Finally, for recent immigrants from post-socialist countries we find a significant 
difference to West German natives in 1997 (.0467**) and in 2002 (.0481**). In contrast, for 
immigrants from post-socialist countries that live in Germany for more than 10 years, we 
find a significant convergence with natives from West Germany (-.0330*). The difference in 
1997 was .0382 and significant at the 1%-level, while the difference in 2002 is only .0051 and 
no longer significantly different from zero.10  
 Summing up, our analysis has produced two main findings. First, although we do not 
observe that Eastern European immigrants display the largest differences to the German 
natives compared to other immigrant groups, we observe that immigrants in general are 
more in favour of state-distributed welfare benefits than the West German natives, as 
                                                            
10 We have performed the same analyses with the three sub-dimensions of our general welfare factor but we 
do not present these analyses in the paper. Interested readers can see the full regression tables (OA7, OA8, 
OA9) and the marginal effect tables (OA10, OA11, OA12) of the additional analyses in the online appendix. 
22 
 
expected. We found that recent Eastern European immigrants display significant differences 
from the West German natives in 1997 and in 2002, while the attitudes of recent 
Mediterranean and Turkish immigrants have converged with the attitudes of West German 
natives by 2002. This lends some support to the expectation that immigrants from countries 
whose welfare regime is most different from the one of Germany (i.e., universal) are also 
most different in their expectations. Second, when the longitudinal patterns are analyzed, 
which is the main aim of this paper, the overwhelming majority of the models show either 
that over time there are no differences between immigrants and natives at all or that 
differences decline. Even if the DID estimator is not significant in every model, we interpret 
these findings as strong evidence for the institutional hypothesis. We do not observe any 
indication of a cultural effect, which would imply lasting differences between natives and 
immigrants.11 
Although it is not a central part of this analysis, the pattern observed in the case of 
East Germans deserves discussion, as it may shed light on the patterns displayed by the 
immigrant groups. East Germans have been socialized under a universal welfare system and 
have been incorporated in the conservative welfare system after the unification of Germany 
in 1989. Thus, they experience a similar pattern of change of institutional context as Eastern 
European immigrants . The results show three interesting details. First, compared with West 
Germans, in all instances East Germans prefer more state intervention, confirming 
expectations that people socialized in universal welfare states expect more state-distributed 
                                                            
11 A possible alternative explanation could be that migrants welfare attitudes are not formed by contact to 
institutions but simply by contact with Germans. To rule our this alternative explanation, we performed an 
additional robustness test in which we included contact with Germans as an additional control variable 
(“contact” is a dummy variable, being 1 if a respondent is German or if she is a migrant that has visited and got 
visits from Germans in the last year). This variable has no effect. The analysis is shown in Table OA13 in the 
online appendix.  
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welfare.  Second, the difference between Eastern Germans and their western counterparts 
significantly diminishes between 1997 and 2002. These findings confirm the previous results 
by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). The convergence observed in this study between 
East and West Germans follows the same pattern observed in the case of the three 
immigrant groups, which we interpret as an indication of the socialization effect of welfare 
state institutions. East and West Germans share a cultural background, while they were 
exposed to different institutions. If we follow the logic of our research design, these 
differences lead us to conclude that the exposure to welfare institutions rather than the 
cultural background is the driver of welfare attitudes. Thus, the differences observed 
between East and West Germans are an additional indicator in favour of the institutional 
explanation which has been supported in the case of immigrants. 
Third, the differences between East and West Germans are still significant in 2002. 
This finding differs from the pattern observed in the case of immigrants who, by 2002, show 
little to no differences compared to the Western Germans. We cannot offer an explanation 
for this pattern with SOEP data. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) argue that the effect of 
communism (due to indoctrination or increased dependency on state) is likely to last very 
long. They estimated that it would take between 20 and 40 years for Eastern Germans' and 
Western Germans' attitudes to fully converge. However, this explanation is likely to be 
weakened by the evidence from Eastern European immigrants, especially those residing for 
more than 10 years. We would like to propose another explanation and set the task for 
future studies to test it. This explanation rests on the observation that unlike immigrants, 
East Germans have not moved from one country to another. Immigrants' moving from one 
country to another is accompanied by a double pressure to adapt to the social and cultural 
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environment of their host countries. On the one hand, immigrants are motivated to adapt 
especially if they perceive adaptation as increasing their chances in the host country (Berry, 
1997). Indeed, it has been shown that such an acculturation process takes place in particular 
with respect to work and economic and social integration (Navas et al., 2007). On the other 
hand, immigrants are expected to adopt social and cultural values of the host society. 
Arguably, part of these values is transmitted through civic integration as well as language 
and culture classes that immigrants are expected to take (Joppke, 2007). Thus, this double 
pressure creates mechanisms through which institutions lead to preference changes and 
thus might explain the disappearance of differences even in the case of recently arrived 
immigrants. The absence of similar pressures in the case of Eastern Germans might explain 
the resilience of different preferences.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This study tested implications derived from cultural and institutional approaches to welfare 
preference formation. Given the differences between countries with respect to their 
citizens’ expectations with respect to welfare, the cultural approach sees immigrants’ 
welfare preferences as stable over time and likely to remain different than those of natives. 
The institutional approach, on the contrary, sees preferences as malleable and shaped by 
contact with institutions. Thus it predicts that over time, immigrants’ welfare preferences 
become similar to those of natives.  
Our analysis produced two main results. First, it showed that different immigrant 
groups have different welfare preferences. This does not come as a surprise and is 
anticipated by both cultural and institutional theories. Second, it showed that over time, 
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regardless of the country of origin, immigrants' preferences become similar to those of 
native West Germans.  
Our findings speak to the culture-institutions debate in formation of welfare 
preferences. Studying individuals who move across institutional contexts opens the 
opportunity to observe whether they maintain preferences associated to the home 
countries or adopt their preferences to the new contexts. We observe differences between 
immigrants' and natives' preferences, which indicate that immigrants travel with certain 
expectations about the role of the state, expectations which may be the reflection of their 
original welfare culture. But over time, these differences disappear.  We interpret the 
observed convergence of natives' and immigrants' preferences as a strong indication in 
favour of institutional arguments. 
Our findings also speak to the literature concerned with the future of European 
welfare states. The debate has been heated by the publication of Alesina and Glaeser’s 
(2004) work, which famously linked the increased ethnic heterogeneity of European 
countries to the unavoidable contraction of their welfare states. In a recent article, Luttmer 
and Singhal (2011) have shown that the preferences of immigrants are different from those 
of natives and are likely to remain different. The authors argued that this difference is due to 
the fact that preferences are rooted in the culture of countries of origin and is likely to affect 
the future welfare policy of host countries. Our findings, indicating that the preferences of 
natives and immigrants converge over time, speak against the warnings that ongoing 
immigration erodes a country’s populations’ consensus on welfare. Converging welfare 
preferences of natives and immigrants coupled with immigrants’ increasing enfranchisement 
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at local and national levels might in fact lead to support for the current forms of welfare 
states.  
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: Support for state-provided welfare by origin countries 
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Notes: General Welfare is a factor score derived from six items from the ESS 2008. See endnote 4 for 
details.  
Source: ESS 2008.  
 
37 
 
Figure 2: Support for state-provided welfare by welfare regimes 
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Notes: General Welfare is a factor score derived from six items from the ESS 2008. See endnote 4 for 
details. Mediterranean = Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey; Post-socialist = Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ukraine.   
Source: ESS 2008.  
38 
 
Figure 3: A second-order measurement model of welfare attitudes 
 
 
Table 1: Correlation matrix of predicted factors from measurement model of welfare attitudes 
    1 2 3 4 
1 General welfare (2nd order) 1.000 
   2 (Un-)employment (1st order) 0.891 1.000 
  3 Old-age, care and sickness (1st order) 0.950 0.758 1.000 
 4 Family and children (1st order) 0.859 0.716 0.718 1.000 
Source: GSOEP. 
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Table 2: Native-migrant-differentials in support for general state-provided welfare by year 
  Natives West   Migrants (<10years)   Migrants (>10 years)   Natives East 
  
Predictive 
Margins   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID 
All Migrants 
                  1997 -0.0344 
 
0.0114 0.0458 ** 
   
0.0029 0.0373 *** 
   
0.0520 0.0864 *** 
  2002 -0.0191 
 
0.0179 0.0370 ** -0.0087 
  
-0.0094 0.0097 
 
-0.0276 ** 
 
0.0425 0.0616 *** -0.0248 *** 
n 4065 
 
382 
     
820 
     
2638 
    Turks 
                   1997 -0.0365
 
0.0321 0.0687 * 
   
0.0157 0.0523 ** 
   
0.0505 0.0870 *** 
  2002 -0.0215 
 
0.0022 0.0237 
 
-0.0450 
  
-0.0023 0.0191 
 
-0.0331 * 
 
0.0408 0.0622 *** -0.0248 *** 
n 4065 
 
67 
     
307 
     
2638 
    Mediterranean 
                  1997 -0.0360 
 
0.0526 0.0887
    
-0.0315 0.0046
    
0.0514 0.0874 *** 
  2002 -0.0206 
 
0.0278 0.0484 
 
-0.0402 
  
-0.0276 -0.0070 
 
-0.0116 
  
0.0420 0.0626 *** -0.0248 *** 
n 4065 
 
20 
     
242 
     
2638 
    Post-socialist 
                  1997 -0.0369 
 
0.0098 0.0467 ** 
   
0.0012 0.0382 ** 
   
0.0496 0.0865 *** 
  2002 -0.0216 
 
0.0265 0.0481 ** 0.0014 
  
-0.0165 0.0051 
 
-0.0330 * 
 
0.0398 0.0615 *** -0.0251 *** 
n 4065  295         271         2638         
Notes: * p<.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001 (one-sided tests). Margins predicted with all covariates at their mean. 
Source: Margins predicted from regression models in Table A3.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Observations by country of origin 
Regime/Country n 
East Germany 2638 
West Germany 4065 
Post-socialist 
 Albania 4 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  3 
Croatia 5 
Czech Republic 8 
Eastern Europe without particular country  45 
Ex-Yugoslavia  169 
Georgia 1 
Hungary 4 
Kazakhstan 61 
Kyrgyzstan 2 
Latvia 1 
Macedonia 1 
Poland 132 
Romania 50 
Russia 60 
Serbia 1 
Tajikistan 7 
Ukraine 11 
Mediterranean  
 Greece 82 
Italy 140 
Portugal 4 
Spain 36 
Turkey 374 
Sum 7904 
Notes: N at the person-level. The number of single occasions is n∙2.  
Source: GSOEP.  
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Table A2: A second-order measurement model of welfare attitudes 
Factor / Item Loading Intercept 
General welfare (second-order factor) 
       (Un-)employment 1 
      Old-age, care and sickness 0.98 *** 
     Family and children 0.94 *** 
       (Un-)employment (first-order factor) 
       Financial security if unemployed 1 
 
3.93 *** 
   Job creation measures 1.26 *** 3.46 *** 
Old-age, care and sickness (first-order factor) 
       Financial security of sick 1 
 
3.48 *** 
   Help for sick 1.68 *** 3.32 *** 
   Financial security for those needing care 1.49 *** 3.55 *** 
   Help for those needing care 1.86 *** 3.30 *** 
   Financial security for old-age 1.26 *** 3.48 *** 
   Help for old-age 1.99 *** 3.29 *** 
Family and Children (first order factor) 
       Financial security for families 1 
 
3.35 *** 
   Caring for pre-schoolers 1.38 *** 3.37 *** 
   Caring for school children 1.17 *** 1997: 3.62 *** 
      2002: 3.13 *** 
Notes: *** p<.001. 
Source: GSOEP. 
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Table A3: Differences-in-differences estimator - general welfare factor 
  General Welfare Factor 
  All migrants Turks Mediterranean Post-socialist 
Year=2002 (Ref.=1997) 0.0153 *** 0.0151 *** 0.0154 *** 0.0153 *** 
Group (Ref.=Natives West) 
           Recent Migrants (≤10 years) 0.0458 ** 0.0687 * 0.0887 
 
0.0467 ** 
   Non-recent Migrants (>10 years) 0.0373 *** 0.0523 ** 0.0046 
 
0.0382 ** 
   Natives East 0.0864 *** 0.0870 *** 0.0874 *** 0.0865 *** 
Year X Group  
           2002 X Recent Migrants -0.0087 
 
-0.0450 
 
-0.0402 
 
0.0014 
    2002 X Non-recent Migrants -0.0276 ** -0.0331 * -0.0116 
 
-0.0330 * 
   2002 X Natives East -0.0248 *** -0.0248 *** -0.0248 *** -0.0251 *** 
Female (Ref.=Male) -0.0041 
 
-0.0055 
 
-0.0038 
 
-0.0039 
 Age (Ref.≤25) 
           26-35 0.0106 
 
0.0097 
 
0.0141 
 
0.0156 * 
   36-45 0.0168 * 0.0197 * 0.0216 ** 0.0212 ** 
   46-55 0.0130 
 
0.0147 
 
0.0180 * 0.0191 * 
   56-65 0.0230 ** 0.0224 ** 0.0285 ** 0.0305 *** 
   66-75 -0.0045 
 
-0.0043 
 
-0.0025 
 
-0.0009 
    76-max -0.0111 
 
-0.0145 
 
-0.0124 
 
-0.0087 
 Empl. Status (Ref.=Non-working) 
           Unemployed 0.0070 
 
0.0057 
 
0.0040 
 
0.0032 
    Working -0.0070 
 
-0.0105 * -0.0102 * -0.0088 
    Retired 0.0227 
 
0.0207 
 
0.0220 
 
0.0251 
 Education (Ref.=Still in School) 
           Inadequately 0.0243 
 
0.0503 * 0.0518 * 0.0408 
    General Elementary 0.0197 
 
0.0174 
 
0.0175 
 
0.0173 
    Middle Vocational 0.0019 
 
0.0002 
 
-0.0042 
 
-0.0007 
    Vocational plus Abitur -0.0386 * -0.0381 * -0.0449 * -0.0427 * 
   Higher Vocational -0.0227 
 
-0.0246 
 
-0.0295 
 
-0.0276 
    Higher Education -0.0370 * -0.0423 * -0.0451 * -0.0397 * 
Equiv. HH-income (in 1,000€) -0.0188 *** -0.0176 *** -0.0189 *** -0.0201 *** 
HH-type (Ref.=1-Person HH) 
           Couple without Children -0.0028 
 
-0.0038 
 
-0.0036 
 
-0.0021 
    Single Parent 0.0011 
 
0.0040 
 
0.0034 
 
0.0024 
    Couple with Children ≤ 16 0.0092 
 
0.0066 
 
0.0105 
 
0.0099 
    Couple with Children > 16 -0.0035 
 
-0.0039 
 
-0.0031 
 
-0.0010 
    Couple with Children ≤ 16 and > 16 0.0012 
 
0.0010 
 
0.0021 
 
0.0035 
    Multiple Generation HH -0.0074 
 
-0.0222 * -0.0189 
 
-0.0103 
    Other Combination -0.0029 
 
-0.0150 
 
-0.0157 
 
-0.0049 
 Satisfaction with Health -0.0051 *** -0.0050 *** -0.0048 *** -0.0050 *** 
Cumulated Unempl. Experience 0.0038 ** 0.0036 ** 0.0034 * 0.0038 ** 
Language Proficiency 0.0021 
 
-0.0064 
 
0.0128 
 
-0.0031 
 Constant 0.0140  0.0265  0.0055  0.0179  
Statistics 
        N 15810 14154 13930 14538 
R2 0.047 0.051 0.053 0.051 
Notes: * p<.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001 (one-sided tests). The model “All Migrants” is based on the full 
sample of natives and migrants (compare Table A1). The models “Turks”, “Mediterranean” and “Post-
socialist” are each based on a sub-sample that excludes the other migrant groups.   
Source: GSOEP. 
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Online Appendix 
Figure OA1: Share of immigrants in the population, labour force and welfare recipients (Source Riphahn 2004) 
 
Source: Riphahn (2004) Immigrant Participation in Social Assistance Programs: Evidence from German Guestworkers. Available 
online at  http://www.lsw.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/userfiles/team/riphahn/immigrant%20participation.pdf 
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Figure OA2: Share of immigrants in the population, labour force and welfare recipients (own calculations) 
 
Source: own calculations, data from Bundesagentur für Arbeit  and DeStatis. 
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Table OA1: Benefits received by EU migrants in Germany (as a percent of total benefits) 
Type of benefit  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  
Sickness and health benefit  2.2%  2.3%  2.3%  2.3%  2.4%  2.6%  2.8%  
Disability  2.2%  2.3%  2.3%  2.3%  2.4%  2.6%  2.8%  
Old age  0.7%  0.7%  0.8%  0.8%  0.8%  0.9%  1.0%  
Survivors  0.7%  0.7%  0.8%  0.8%  0.8%  0.9%  1.0%  
Family/Children  1.9%  0.6%  1.9%  2.2%  1.9%  1.9%  2.3%  
Unemployment  4.2%  4.4%  4.6%  4.8%  5.0%  5.3%  5.4%  
Housing  3.2%  4.2%  3.5%  4.6%  3.1%  2.8%  4.1%  
Social exclusion  3.2%  4.2%  3.5%  4.6%  3.1%  2.8%  4.1%  
Total  1.5%  1.4%  1.6%  1.7%  1.7%  1.7%  1.9%  
Total benefits excl. old-age and survivors' benefits  2.1%  2.0%  2.2%  2.4%  2.2%  2.3%  2.6%  
Source: ECAS 2014 , p. 46. 
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Table OA2: Fiscal contribution of EU migrants in Germany 
Type of tax  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  
                                                                    In EUR million  
Direct  26165  27063  26726  26087  29541  31757  33808  
Indirect  4490  4992  4698  4581  5297  5811  6334  
Total  30654  32054  31424  30668  34838  37568  40142  
                                                                   As a percentof GDP  
Direct  1.1%  1.1%  1.1%  1.0%  1.1%  1.2%  1.2%  
Indirect  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  
Total  1.3%  1.3%  1.3%  1.2%  1.3%  1.4%  1.5%  
                                                                    As a percent of total government revenue  
Direct  2.5%  2.5%  2.3%  2.2%  2.5%  2.7%  2.8%  
Indirect  0.4%  0.5%  0.4%  0.4%  0.4%  0.5%  0.5%  
Total  2.9%  2.9%  2.7%  2.6%  3.0%  3.2%  3.3%  
Source: ECAS 2014, p66. 
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Table OA3: Comparison between Turkish, Mediterranean, Conservative, Liberal and Social-Democratic welfare 
systems 
Criterion 
 
Turkey Souther European countries 
Conservative (DE) / Liberal (UK) / 
Social-democratic (SE) 
Polarisation and generosity  
   
Pension Gini coefficient 
(higher values indicate 
inequality) 
 25.1 
Greece 26.5 
Italy 26.4 
Portugal 22.1 
Spain 22.1 
Germany 20 
Sweden 23.7 
UK 5.1 
OECD average 17.2 
Progressivity index (higher 
values - higher dependency 
on pre-retirement 
earnings) 
 7.8 similar values to Sweden 
Germany 26.7 
Sweden 12.9 
UK 81.1 
OECD average 37.5 
health system - public 
coverage 
 
66%  recent reforms in the 
direction of Southern 
European countries 
100% 
Germany 90% 
Sweden 100% 
UK 100% 
State penetration & social 
assistance 
 
   
social protection 
expenditure % GDP 
 
overall 11.6%, of which 
5.5% old-age coverage  
4.8% health expenditures 
Greece 21.3% 
Italy 24.2% 
Portugal 23.5% 
Spain 20.5% 
Germany 27.6% 
Sweden 31.3% 
UK 20.15 
OECD average 20.7% 
poverty aleviation 
effectiveness 
% of population at risk of 
poverty before and after 
social assistance 
distribution 
 before 31%, after 26% 
Greece: before 23% after 20% 
Italy: before 24%  after 19%   
Portugal: before 26% after 
20%   Spain: before 24% after 
20% 
Germany: before 24% after 13%   
Sweden: before 29% after 9% 
UK: before 31% after 18% 
Public-private mix  
limited, no legal basis for 
decentralization at 
municipal level, welfare 
distribution at municipal 
level by charities 
high level of public-private 
mix 
Germany: high level of public-
private mix  
Sweden: public provision  
UK: market/private dominated 
(charities) 
Model  family and kin solidarity family and kin solidarity 
Germany: male breadwinner 
Sweden: dual breadwinner 
UK: dual breadwinner 
Family support  
   
Family benefits % GDP  less than 0.5% 
Greece <0.5% 
Italy,  Portugal,  Spain 0.5%-
1% 
Germany 1.2% 
Sweden 1.6% 
UK  2.2% 
Paid parental leave  no 
Spain no 
Portugal no 
Greece no 
Germany: 104 weeks at 11% 
allowance  Sweden: 51 weeks at 
80% allowance 
Unpaid parental leave  no 
Portugal 24 weeks 
Greece 28 weeks 
Italy 24 weeks 
Spain 156 weeks 
UK  26 weeks 
 Source: Author's summary of arguments presented by Grütjen, Daniel (2008): The Turkish welfare regime: An example of the 
Southern European model? The role of the state, market and family in welfare provision, Turkish Policy Quarterly 7(1):111-129. 
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Table OA4: Correlation matrix of predicted factors and observed items 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
Factors 
               1    General welfare (2nd order) 1.000 
              2    (Un-)employment (1st order) 0.891 1.000 
             3    Old-age, care and sickness (1st order) 0.950 0.758 1.000 
            4    Family and children (1st order) 0.859 0.716 0.718 1.000 
           
 
Observed Items 
               5    Financial security if unemployed 0.443 0.674 0.290 0.330 1.000 
          6    Job creation measures 0.504 0.743 0.346 0.371 0.341 1.000 
         7    Financial security of sick 0.452 0.429 0.435 0.345 0.454 0.323 1.000 
        8    Help for sick 0.762 0.610 0.797 0.583 0.239 0.265 0.416 1.000 
       9    Financial security for those needing care 0.629 0.510 0.665 0.461 0.378 0.247 0.468 0.460 1.000 
      10    Help for those needing care 0.791 0.614 0.856 0.571 0.205 0.245 0.325 0.583 0.621 1.000 
     11    Financial security for old-age 0.509 0.443 0.516 0.383 0.431 0.271 0.540 0.381 0.535 0.363 1.000 
    12    Help for old-age 0.862 0.663 0.933 0.629 0.211 0.259 0.323 0.645 0.541 0.706 0.409 1.000 
   13    Financial security for families 0.409 0.362 0.262 0.623 0.368 0.231 0.382 0.225 0.287 0.162 0.408 0.198 1.000 
  14    Caring for pre-schoolers 0.516 0.396 0.357 0.800 0.149 0.148 0.170 0.284 0.206 0.258 0.180 0.277 0.289 1.000 
 15    Caring for school children 0.425 0.320 0.303 0.652 0.136 0.103 0.143 0.238 0.199 0.218 0.178 0.236 0.231 0.669 1.000 
Source: GSOEP. 
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Table OA5: Correlation matrix of predicted factor and covariates 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 General welfare factor 1.00 
                   2 (Un-)employment factor 0.89 1.00 
                  3 Old-age, care and sickness factor 0.95 0.76 1.00 
                 4 Family and children factor 0.86 0.72 0.72 1.00 
                5 Year=2002 (Ref.=1997) 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 1.00 
               6 Natives West -0.15 -0.17 -0.11 -0.16 0.00 1.00 
              7 Recent Migrants (≤10 years) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.23 1.00 
             8 Non-recent Migrants (>10 years) 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.35 -0.08 1.00 
            9 Natives East 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.01 -0.72 -0.16 -0.24 1.00 
           10 Female (Ref.=Male) 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 1.00 
          11 Age ≤25 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.01 1.00 
         12 Age 26-35 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.15 1.00 
        13 Age 36-45 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.16 -0.28 1.00 
       14 Age 46-55 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.13 -0.24 -0.26 1.00 
      15 Age56-65 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.23 -0.25 -0.21 1.00 
     16 Age 66-75 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.17 -0.18 -0.15 -0.15 1.00 
    17 Age 76-max 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 1.00 
   18 Non-working 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.18 0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.08 0.34 -0.14 -0.10 1.00 
  19 Unemployed 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.13 0.04 0.04 0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.14 1.00 
 20 Working -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.17 -0.02 0.17 0.25 0.18 -0.21 -0.37 -0.25 -0.62 -0.31 1.00 
21 Retired 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.11 -0.20 -0.22 -0.18 -0.16 0.77 0.52 -0.21 -0.10 -0.46 
22 Still in School 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.33 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.17 -0.03 -0.11 
23 Inadequately 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.12 0.04 0.32 -0.10 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.06 
24 General Elementary 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.12 -0.16 0.11 0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.06 -0.01 -0.14 
25 Middle Vocational 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.09 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.01 
26 Vocational plus Abitur -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.05 
27 Higher Vocational -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.07 
28 Higher Education -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.11 0.17 -0.05 -0.12 -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.14 
29 Equiv. HH-income (in 1,000€) -0.12 -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 0.10 0.19 -0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.11 -0.15 0.23 
30 1-Person HH 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.11 0.22 -0.06 -0.01 -0.10 
31 Couple without Children 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 -0.25 -0.02 0.27 0.22 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.17 
32 Single Parent 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.03 
33 Couple with Children ≤ 16 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.10 0.30 0.29 -0.15 -0.23 -0.18 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.17 
34 Couple with Children > 16 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.16 -0.12 -0.08 0.19 0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.02 0.00 0.06 
35 Couple with Children ≤ 16 and > 16 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.11 -0.13 0.19 0.06 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.07 
36 Multiple Generation HH 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.07 0.09 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.03 
37 Other Combination 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
38 Satisfaction with Health -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.15 0.19 0.07 -0.07 -0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.06 -0.05 0.21 
39 Cumulated Unempl. Experience 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.09 -0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.32 -0.17 
40 Language Proficiency 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.34 0.39 0.63 -0.23 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.06 -0.05 
Continued on next page 
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Continuation of Table OA5 
21 Retired 
21 
1.00 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
22 Still in School -0.04 1.00 
                  23 Inadequately -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
                 24 General Elementary 0.14 -0.04 -0.09 1.00 
                25 Middle Vocational -0.02 -0.09 -0.18 -0.47 1.00 
               26 Vocational plus Abitur -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.21 1.00 
              27 Higher Vocational -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 -0.29 -0.06 1.00 
             28 Higher Education -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.21 -0.43 -0.09 -0.13 1.00 
            29 Equiv. HH-income (in 1,000€) -0.09 0.02 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08 0.03 0.04 0.24 1.00 
           30 1-Person HH 0.22 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.18 1.00 
          31 Couple without Children 0.21 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.25 1.00 
         32 Single Parent -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 -0.08 -0.15 1.00 
        33 Couple with Children ≤ 16 -0.21 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.20 -0.37 -0.12 1.00 
       34 Couple with Children > 16 -0.11 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.16 -0.17 -0.31 -0.10 -0.25 1.00 
      35 Couple with Children ≤ 16 and > 16 -0.11 0.12 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.19 -0.06 -0.15 -0.13 1.00 
     36 Multiple Generation HH 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 1.00 
    37 Other Combination -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 1.00 
   38 Satisfaction with Health -0.19 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.11 -0.06 -0.13 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 1.00 
  39 Cumulated Unempl. Experience -0.04 -0.04 0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.18 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 1.00 
 40 Language Proficiency -0.05 -0.03 0.40 0.13 -0.12 0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.14 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.12 -0.03 -0.04 0.13 1.00 
Source: GSOEP. 
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Table OA6: Summary statistics of all variables 
  N Mean StdDev Min Max 
General welfare factor 15810 0.002 0.221 -1.022 0.710 
(Un-)employment factor 15810 0.003 0.283 -1.296 1.018 
Old-age, care and sickness factor 15810 0.002 0.303 -1.150 0.833 
Family and children factor 15810 0.003 0.295 -1.234 0.957 
Year=2002 (Ref.=1997) 15810 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Natives West 15810 0.514 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Recent Migrants (≤10 years) 15810 0.048 0.214 0.000 1.000 
Non-recent Migrants (>10 years) 15810 0.104 0.305 0.000 1.000 
Natives East 15810 0.334 0.472 0.000 1.000 
Female (Ref.=Male) 15810 0.518 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Age ≤25 15810 0.075 0.264 0.000 1.000 
Age 26-35 15810 0.204 0.403 0.000 1.000 
Age 36-45 15810 0.233 0.423 0.000 1.000 
Age 46-55 15810 0.179 0.384 0.000 1.000 
Age56-65 15810 0.168 0.374 0.000 1.000 
Age 66-75 15810 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000 
Age 76-max 15810 0.041 0.198 0.000 1.000 
Non-working 15810 0.217 0.412 0.000 1.000 
Unemployed 15810 0.066 0.248 0.000 1.000 
Working 15810 0.584 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Retired 15810 0.133 0.340 0.000 1.000 
Still in School 15810 0.009 0.092 0.000 1.000 
Inadequately 15810 0.030 0.171 0.000 1.000 
General Elementary 15810 0.182 0.386 0.000 1.000 
Middle Vocational 15810 0.492 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Vocational plus Abitur 15810 0.044 0.205 0.000 1.000 
Higher Vocational 15810 0.080 0.272 0.000 1.000 
Higher Education 15810 0.163 0.370 0.000 1.000 
Equiv. HH-income (in 1,000€) 15810 1.363 0.659 0.033 10.607 
1-Person HH 15810 0.117 0.321 0.000 1.000 
Couple without Children 15810 0.314 0.464 0.000 1.000 
Single Parent 15810 0.048 0.215 0.000 1.000 
Couple with Children ≤ 16 15810 0.228 0.420 0.000 1.000 
Couple with Children > 16 15810 0.173 0.378 0.000 1.000 
Couple with Children ≤ 16 and > 16 15810 0.075 0.264 0.000 1.000 
Multiple Generation HH 15810 0.028 0.166 0.000 1.000 
Other Combination 15810 0.017 0.128 0.000 1.000 
Satisfaction with Health 15810 6.468 2.139 0.000 10.000 
Cumulated Unempl. Experience 15810 0.740 1.662 0.000 26.000 
Language Proficiency 15810 1.220 0.679 1.000 5.000 
Notes: N at the observational level.  
Source: GSOEP. 
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Table OA7: Differences-in-differences estimator – (un-)employment factor 
  (Un-)employment 
  All migrants Turks Mediterranean Post-socialist 
Year=2002 (Ref.=1997) 0.0132 ** 0.0130 ** 0.0135 ** 0.0134 ** 
Group (Ref.=Natives West) 
           Recent Migrants (≤10 years) 0.0495 ** 0.0522 
 
0.0538 
 
0.0519 ** 
   Non-recent Migrants (>10 years) 0.0340 ** 0.0505 * -0.0049 
 
0.0353 * 
   Natives East 0.1235 *** 0.1242 *** 0.1247 *** 0.1239 *** 
Year X Group  
           2002 X Recent Migrants 0.0031 
 
-0.0164 
 
-0.0177 
 
0.0093 
    2002 X Non-recent Migrants -0.0200 
 
-0.0291 
 
0.0058 
 
-0.0311 
    2002 X Natives East -0.0237 ** -0.0237 ** -0.0237 ** -0.0242 ** 
Female (Ref.=Male) 0.0119 ** 0.0113 * 0.0140 ** 0.0129 ** 
Age (Ref.≤25) 
           26-35 0.0092 
 
0.0075 
 
0.0144 
 
0.0155 
    36-45 0.0127 
 
0.0162 
 
0.0200 * 0.0193 * 
   46-55 0.0160 
 
0.0172 
 
0.0225 * 0.0230 * 
   56-65 0.0250 * 0.0230 * 0.0319 ** 0.0321 ** 
   66-75 0.0019 
 
-0.0022 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0038 
    76-max 0.0005 
 
-0.0100 
 
-0.0062 
 
-0.0014 
 Empl. Status (Ref.=Non-working) 
           Unemployed 0.0113 
 
0.0121 
 
0.0079 
 
0.0031 
    Working -0.0137 * -0.0168 ** -0.0183 ** -0.0173 ** 
   Retired 0.0152 
 
0.0176 
 
0.0177 
 
0.0196 
 Education (Ref.=Still in School) 
           Inadequately 0.0294 
 
0.0533 * 0.0600 * 0.0488 
    General Elementary 0.0307 
 
0.0296 
 
0.0301 
 
0.0291 
    Middle Vocational 0.0129 
 
0.0124 
 
0.0085 
 
0.0106 
    Vocational plus Abitur -0.0427 
 
-0.0438 
 
-0.0533 * -0.0466 * 
   Higher Vocational -0.0193 
 
-0.0212 
 
-0.0254 
 
-0.0249 
    Higher Education -0.0515 * -0.0576 * -0.0597 * -0.0539 * 
Equiv. HH-income (in 1,000€) -0.0279 *** -0.0273 *** -0.0284 *** -0.0298 *** 
HH-type (Ref.=1-Person HH) 
           Couple without Children -0.0031 
 
-0.0037 
 
-0.0046 
 
-0.0017 
    Single Parent -0.0097 
 
-0.0083 
 
-0.0076 
 
-0.0082 
    Couple with Children ≤ 16 0.0127 
 
0.0069 
 
0.0110 
 
0.0128 
    Couple with Children > 16 -0.0065 
 
-0.0101 
 
-0.0077 
 
-0.0034 
    Couple with Children ≤ 16 and > 16 0.0130 
 
0.0085 
 
0.0098 
 
0.0134 
    Multiple Generation HH -0.0008 
 
-0.0196 
 
-0.0102 
 
0.0050 
    Other Combination -0.0128 
 
-0.0271 
 
-0.0309 * -0.0139 
 Satisfaction with Health -0.0046 *** -0.0042 *** -0.0041 *** -0.0042 *** 
Cumulated Unempl. Experience 0.0041 ** 0.0037 * 0.0030 
 
0.0042 ** 
Language Proficiency 0.0013 
 
-0.0098 
 
0.0152 
 
0.0018 
 Constant 0.0018  0.0168  -0.0114  -0.0012  
Statistics 
        N 15810 14154 13930 14538 
R2 0.059 0.065 0.067 0.064 
Notes: * p<.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001 (one-sided tests). 
Source: GSOEP. 
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Table OA8: Differences-in-differences estimator – old-age/care/sickness factor 
  Old-age/care/sickness 
  All migrants Turks Mediterranean Post-socialist 
Year=2002 (Ref.=1997) 0.0251 *** 0.0247 *** 0.0252 *** 0.0251 *** 
Group (Ref.=Natives West) 
           Recent Migrants (≤10 years) 0.0597 ** 0.1214 ** 0.1135 
 
0.0593 ** 
   Non-recent Migrants (>10 years) 0.0491 *** 0.0704 ** 0.0014 
 
0.0551 ** 
   Natives East 0.0875 *** 0.0882 *** 0.0888 *** 0.0876 *** 
Year X Group  
           2002 X Recent Migrants -0.0128 
 
-0.1005 * 0.0167 
 
0.0043 
    2002 X Non-recent Migrants -0.0301 * -0.0350 
 
-0.0017 
 
-0.0460 * 
   2002 X Natives East -0.0408 *** -0.0406 *** -0.0409 *** -0.0411 *** 
Female (Ref.=Male) -0.0117 * -0.0130 * -0.0119 * -0.0117 * 
Age (Ref.≤25) 
           26-35 0.0129 
 
0.0151 
 
0.0212 * 0.0202 * 
   36-45 0.0229 * 0.0288 ** 0.0312 ** 0.0283 ** 
   46-55 0.0175 
 
0.0225 * 0.0268 * 0.0263 * 
   56-65 0.0290 * 0.0317 ** 0.0393 ** 0.0398 ** 
   66-75 -0.0121 
 
-0.0053 
 
-0.0045 
 
-0.0057 
    76-max -0.0145 
 
-0.0100 
 
-0.0092 
 
-0.0081 
 Empl. Status (Ref.=Non-working) 
           Unemployed 0.0072 
 
0.0041 
 
0.0031 
 
0.0041 
    Working -0.0033 
 
-0.0074 
 
-0.0050 
 
-0.0048 
    Retired 0.0354 
 
0.0290 
 
0.0340 
 
0.0376 
 Education (Ref.=Still in School) 
           Inadequately 0.0217 
 
0.0578 * 0.0572 
 
0.0491 
    General Elementary 0.0162 
 
0.0098 
 
0.0092 
 
0.0112 
    Middle Vocational -0.0069 
 
-0.0097 
 
-0.0182 
 
-0.0111 
    Vocational plus Abitur -0.0575 * -0.0565 * -0.0674 * -0.0644 * 
   Higher Vocational -0.0360 
 
-0.0400 
 
-0.0487 * -0.0433 
    Higher Education -0.0513 * -0.0588 * -0.0647 * -0.0559 * 
Equiv. HH-income (in 1,000€) -0.0215 *** -0.0195 *** -0.0217 *** -0.0225 *** 
HH-type (Ref.=1-Person HH) 
           Couple without Children -0.0059 
 
-0.0076 
 
-0.0061 
 
-0.0056 
    Single Parent 0.0005 
 
0.0036 
 
0.0030 
 
0.0026 
    Couple with Children ≤ 16 0.0040 
 
0.0024 
 
0.0075 
 
0.0053 
    Couple with Children > 16 -0.0056 
 
-0.0037 
 
-0.0030 
 
-0.0034 
    Couple with Children ≤ 16 and > 16 -0.0090 
 
-0.0074 
 
-0.0049 
 
-0.0040 
    Multiple Generation HH -0.0058 
 
-0.0251 
 
-0.0188 
 
-0.0156 
    Other Combination -0.0050 
 
-0.0185 
 
-0.0185 
 
-0.0085 
 Satisfaction with Health -0.0073 *** -0.0075 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0073 *** 
Cumulated Unempl. Experience 0.0060 *** 0.0055 ** 0.0059 ** 0.0061 ** 
Language Proficiency 0.0036 
 
-0.0084 
 
0.0184 
 
-0.0071 
 Constant 0.0336  0.0488  0.0211  0.0428  
Statistics 
        N 15810 14154 13930 14538 
R2 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.033 
Notes: * p<.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001 (one-sided tests). 
Source: GSOEP. 
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Table OA9: Differences-in-differences estimator – family and children factor 
  Family and Children 
  All migrants Turks Mediterranean Post-socialist 
Year=2002 (Ref.=1997) -0.0053 
 
-0.0054 
 
-0.0051 
 
-0.0052 
 Group (Ref.=Natives West) 
           Recent Migrants (≤10 years) 0.0481 ** 0.0338 
 
0.1579 * 0.0500 * 
   Non-recent Migrants (>10 years) 0.0435 ** 0.0534 * 0.0278 
 
0.0339 
    Natives East 0.1039 *** 0.1049 *** 0.1052 *** 0.1039 *** 
Year X Group  
           2002 X Recent Migrants -0.0072 
 
0.0050 
 
-0.1953 * 0.0030 
    2002 X Non-recent Migrants -0.0422 ** -0.0480 * -0.0486 * -0.0272 
    2002 X Natives East 0.0105 
 
0.0100 
 
0.0105 
 
0.0101 
 Female (Ref.=Male) -0.0121 * -0.0159 ** -0.0128 * -0.0122 * 
Age (Ref.≤25) 
           26-35 0.0181 
 
0.0115 
 
0.0126 
 
0.0209 * 
   36-45 0.0262 * 0.0248 * 0.0249 * 0.0292 ** 
   46-55 0.0118 
 
0.0100 
 
0.0114 
 
0.0166 
    56-65 0.0289 ** 0.0233 * 0.0275 * 0.0355 ** 
   66-75 -0.0046 
 
-0.0122 
 
-0.0084 
 
-0.0031 
    76-max -0.0308 
 
-0.0451 
 
-0.0414 
 
-0.0302 
 Empl. Status (Ref.=Non-working) 
           Unemployed 0.0061 
 
0.0045 
 
0.0025 
 
0.0023 
    Working -0.0133 * -0.0189 ** -0.0204 ** -0.0154 * 
   Retired 0.0307 
 
0.0310 
 
0.0273 
 
0.0337 
 Education (Ref.=Still in School) 
           Inadequately 0.0436 
 
0.0756 * 0.0741 * 0.0484 
    General Elementary 0.0307 
 
0.0336 
 
0.0345 
 
0.0315 
    Middle Vocational 0.0066 
 
0.0046 
 
0.0034 
 
0.0049 
    Vocational plus Abitur -0.0333 
 
-0.0308 
 
-0.0324 
 
-0.0338 
    Higher Vocational -0.0214 
 
-0.0207 
 
-0.0230 
 
-0.0249 
    Higher Education -0.0267 
 
-0.0314 
 
-0.0316 
 
-0.0280 
 Equiv. HH-income (in 1,000€) -0.0203 *** -0.0190 *** -0.0198 *** -0.0228 *** 
HH-type (Ref.=1-Person HH) 
           Couple without Children 0.0012 
 
0.0001 
 
-0.0004 
 
0.0025 
    Single Parent 0.0152 
 
0.0220 
 
0.0189 
 
0.0157 
    Couple with Children ≤ 16 0.0245 ** 0.0217 * 0.0263 ** 0.0255 ** 
   Couple with Children > 16 0.0032 
 
0.0014 
 
0.0018 
 
0.0076 
    Couple with Children ≤ 16 and > 16 0.0095 
 
0.0118 
 
0.0099 
 
0.0113 
    Multiple Generation HH -0.0242 
 
-0.0397 * -0.0457 ** -0.0259 
    Other Combination 0.0157 
 
-0.0004 
 
0.0007 
 
0.0145 
 Satisfaction with Health -0.0061 *** -0.0059 *** -0.0055 *** -0.0059 *** 
Cumulated Unempl. Experience 0.0028 
 
0.0035 * 0.0028 
 
0.0030 
 Language Proficiency 0.0013 
 
-0.0032 
 
0.0055 
 
-0.0033 
 Constant 0.0122  0.0245  0.0133  0.0164  
Statistics 
        N 15810 14154 13930 14538 
R2 0.045 0.050 0.052 0.048 
Notes: * p<.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001 (one-sided tests). 
Source: GSOEP. 
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Table OA10: Predicted margins and DID estimator from regression models of the (un-)employment factor 
  Natives West   Migrants (<10years)   Migrants (>10 years)   Natives East 
  
Predictive 
Margins   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID 
All Migrants 
                  1997 -0.0461 
 
0.0034 0.0495 **
   
-0.0121 0.0340 ** 
   
0.0773 0.1235 *** 
  2002 -0.0329 
 
0.0197 0.0526 *** 0.0031 
  
-0.0189 0.0141 
 
-0.0200 
  
0.0669 0.0998 *** -0.0237 ** 
n 4065 
 
382 
     
820 
     
2638 
    Turks 
                   1997 -0.0488
 
0.0034 0.0522
    
0.0017 0.0505 * 
   
0.0753 0.1242 *** 
  2002 -0.0358 
 
0.0000 0.0358 
 
-0.0164 
  
-0.0144 0.0214 
 
-0.0291 
  
0.0646 0.1004 *** -0.0237 ** 
n 4065 
 
67 
     
307 
     
2638 
    Mediterranean 
                  1997 -0.0482 
 
0.0055 0.0538
    
-0.0532 -0.0049
    
0.0764 0.1247 *** 
  2002 -0.0347 
 
0.0014 0.0361 
 
-0.0177 
  
-0.0339 0.0008 
 
0.0058 
  
0.0663 0.1010 *** -0.0237 ** 
n 4065 
 
20 
     
242 
     
2638 
    Post-socialist 
                  1997 -0.0487 
 
0.0031 0.0519 ** 
   
-0.0134 0.0353 * 
   
0.0752 0.1239 *** 
  2002 -0.0353 
 
0.0258 0.0612 ** 0.0093 
  
-0.0312 0.0042 
 
-0.0311 
  
0.0644 0.0997 *** -0.0242 ** 
n 4065  295         271        2638         
Notes: * p<.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001 (one-sided tests). Margins predicted with all covariates at their mean. 
Source: Estimates predicted from regression models in Table OA7. 
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Table OA11: Predicted margins and DID estimator from regression models of the old-age/care/sickness factor 
  Natives West   Migrants (<10years)   Migrants (>10 years)   Natives East 
  
Predictive 
Margins   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID 
All Migrants 
                  1997 -0.0461 
 
0.0034 0.0495 **
   
-0.0121 0.0340 ** 
   
0.0773 0.1235 *** 
  2002 -0.0329 
 
0.0197 0.0526 *** 0.0031 
  
-0.0189 0.0141 
 
-0.0200 
  
0.0669 0.0998 *** -0.0237 ** 
n 4065 
 
382 
     
820 
     
2638 
    Turks 
                   1997 -0.0488
 
0.0034 0.0522
    
0.0017 0.0505 * 
   
0.0753 0.1242 *** 
  2002 -0.0358 
 
0.0000 0.0358 
 
-0.0164 
  
-0.0144 0.0214 
 
-0.0291 
  
0.0646 0.1004 *** -0.0237 ** 
n 4065 
 
67 
     
307 
     
2638 
    Mediterranean 
                  1997 -0.0482 
 
0.0055 0.0538
    
-0.0532 -0.0049
    
0.0764 0.1247 *** 
  2002 -0.0347 
 
0.0014 0.0361 
 
-0.0177 
  
-0.0339 0.0008 
 
0.0058 
  
0.0663 0.1010 *** -0.0237 ** 
n 4065 
 
20 
     
242 
     
2638 
    Post-socialist 
                  1997 -0.0487 
 
0.0031 0.0519 ** 
   
-0.0134 0.0353 * 
   
0.0752 0.1239 *** 
  2002 -0.0353 
 
0.0258 0.0612 ** 0.0093 
  
-0.0312 0.0042 
 
-0.0311 
  
0.0644 0.0997 *** -0.0242 ** 
n 4065  295         271        2638         
Notes: * p<.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001 (one-sided tests). Margins predicted with all covariates at their mean. 
Source: Estimates predicted from regression models in Table OA8. 
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Table OA12: Predicted margins and DID estimator from regression models of the family and children factor 
  Natives West   Migrants (<10years)   Migrants (>10 years)   Natives East 
  
Predictive 
Margins   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID   
Predictive 
Margins 
Difference 
Native West DID 
All Migrants 
                  1997 -0.0357 
 
0.0123 0.0481 ** 
   
0.0078 0.0435 ** 
   
0.0682 0.1039 *** 
  2002 -0.0410 
 
-0.0002 0.0409 * -0.0072 
  
-0.0398 0.0013 
 
-0.0422 ** 
 
0.0734 0.1144 *** 0.0105 
 n 4065 
 
382 
     
820 
     
2638 
    Turks 
                   1997 -0.0374
 
-0.0036 0.0338
    
0.0159 0.0534 * 
   
0.0675 0.1049 *** 
  2002 -0.0428 
 
-0.0040 0.0389 
 
0.0050 
  
-0.0375 0.0054 
 
-0.0480 * 
 
0.0721 0.1150 *** 0.0100 
 n 4065 
 
67 
     
307 
     
2638 
    Mediterranean 
                  1997 -0.0380 
 
0.1198 0.1579 * 
   
-0.0102 0.0278
    
0.0672 0.1052 *** 
  2002 -0.0432 
 
-0.0806 -0.0374 
 
-0.1953 * 
 
-0.0639 -0.0207 
 
-0.0486 * 
 
0.0725 0.1157 *** 0.0105 
 n 4065 
 
20 
     
242 
     
2638 
    Post-socialist 
                  1997 -0.0385 
 
0.0115 0.0500 * 
   
-0.0046 0.0339
    
0.0654 0.1039 *** 
  2002 -0.0437 
 
0.0093 0.0530 ** 0.0030 
  
-0.0370 0.0067 
 
-0.0272 
  
0.0703 0.1140 *** 0.0101 
 n 4065  295         271        2638        
Notes: * p<.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001 (one-sided tests). Margins predicted with all covariates at their mean. 
Source: Estimates predicted from regression models in Table OA9. 
58 
 
Table OA13: Regression on general welfare factor with complete sample and controlling for 
contact with Germans 
  M1 M2 
Year=2002 (Ref.=1997) 0.0152 *** 0.0153 *** 
Group (Ref.=Natives West) 
       Recent Migrants (≤10 years) 0.0461 ** 0.0462 ** 
   Non-recent Migrants (>10 years) 0.0365 *** 0.0363 *** 
   Natives East 0.0865 *** 0.0864 *** 
Year X Group  
       2002 X Recent Migrants -0.0092 
 
-0.0117 
    2002 X Non-recent Migrants -0.0266 ** -0.0265 ** 
   2002 X Natives East -0.0247 *** -0.0247 *** 
Female (Ref.=Male) -0.0035 
 
-0.0035 
 Age (Ref.≤25) 
       26-35 0.0106 
 
0.0104 
    36-45 0.0167 * 0.0164 * 
   46-55 0.0130 
 
0.0127 
    56-65 0.0237 ** 0.0234 ** 
   66-75 -0.0041 
 
-0.0049 
    76-max -0.0111 
 
-0.0118 
 Empl. Status (Ref.=Non-working) 
       Unemployed 0.0055 
 
0.0056 
    Working -0.0072 
 
-0.0074 
    Retired 0.0226 
 
0.0229 
 Education (Ref.=Still in School) 
       Inadequately 0.0230 
 
0.0241 
    General Elementary 0.0191 
 
0.0194 
    Middle Vocational 0.0018 
 
0.0022 
    Vocational plus Abitur -0.0387 * -0.0384 * 
   Higher Vocational -0.0229 
 
-0.0225 
    Higher Education -0.0370 * -0.0365 * 
Equiv. HH-income (in 1,000€) -0.0186 *** -0.0187 *** 
HH-type (Ref.=1-Person HH) 
       Couple without Children -0.0030 
 
-0.0030 
    Single Parent 0.0012 
 
0.0012 
    Couple with Children ≤ 16 0.0095 
 
0.0096 
    Couple with Children > 16 -0.0035 
 
-0.0036 
    Couple with Children ≤ 16 and > 16 0.0005 
 
0.0006 
    Multiple Generation HH -0.0069 
 
-0.0060 
    Other Combination -0.0029 
 
-0.0029 
 Satisfaction with Health -0.0052 *** -0.0052 *** 
Cumulated Unempl. Experience 0.0037 ** 0.0037 ** 
Language Proficiency 0.0022 
 
0.0045 
 Contact with Germans 
  
0.0271 
 Constant 0.0144  -0.0152  
Statistics 
    N 15742 15742 
R2 0.047 0.047 
Notes: * p<.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001 (one-sided tests). 
Source: GSOEP. 
  
 
